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COMMENTS
"WRONGFUL LIVING": RECOVERY FOR A
PHYSICIAN'S INFRINGEMENT ON AN
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO DIE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health, recognized a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest under the due process clause in a person's refusal of
unwan ted lifesaving medical treatment.' The Court viewed this right as
the logical outgrowth of the common law doctrine of informed consent
which provides that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."' The recognition of
this constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment has led to
1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). Citing the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution which provides that no State shall
"depriv any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," the Supreme
Court h, ld that a competent person has a liberty interest in refusing unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment. Id. at 278. The Court recognized the need to balance an individual's
liberty interests with state interests of the "protection and preservation of human life" Id.
at 280. 'to establish this balance, the Court recognized the state of Missouri's standard of
proof requiring "clear and convincing" evidence of an individual's desire to refuse treat-
ment. /d. at 284. The right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment as recognized
in Cruzan was affirmed again recently by the United States Supreme Court in Washington
v. Gluclsberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997).
2. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Justice Cardozo of the Court of Appeals of New
York in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914)). The Court expands the common-law doctrine to include the right to refuse
lifesaving treatment reasoning that "[t]he logical corollary of the doctrine of informed con-
sent is t aat the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treat-
ment." Id. at 270. Other courts have grounded a right to refuse treatment in a
constitutional right to privacy. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 922 (N.J.), cert. denied sub
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 647 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
Karen Quinlan had a right of privacy, grounded in the Federal Constitution, to terminate
treatment. Id. at 662-64. Traditionally, courts have based a right to refuse medical treat-
ment ei:her solely on the common-law right to informed consent or both on the common-
law right and a constitutional privacy right. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-77.
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both federal and state legislation designed to preserve that right and to
provide the practical means and protocols for its enforcement.' But while
Cruzan confirmed the existence of the right to refuse medical treatment,
or the "right to die"4 as it is often called, and federal and state legislation
has given it some practical effect,5 a corresponding ability to recover
damages caused by the infringement of this liberty has not gained general
acceptance in the American legal community.
6
"Wrongful living" is a relatively new cause of action that seeks to re-
dress a medical professional's intentional or negligent interference with
an individual's right to refuse medical treatment.7 The rationale for the
wrongful living cause of action is that medical professionals who adminis-
ter unwanted resuscitation or maintain unwanted life support systems in
direct violation of the patient's express wishes should be liable to that
patient in some fashion for the unwanted prolongation of life.8 Despite
3. See discussion of the Patient's Self Determination Act and related state statutes
infra notes 25-33.
4. 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 4 (2d ed. 1995). This Comment limits the
application of the term "right to die" to the discussion of the constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment established in Cruzan. It will not explore the existence or non-existence
of a constitutionally protected right to determine the time and manner of one's own death
as recently discussed in the Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997). In that case, the Court held that the right to assistance in committing
suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id. at
2271.
5. See infra notes 25-27.
6. Tricia Jonas Hackelman, Violation of an Individual's Right to Die: The Need for a
Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355, 1381 (1996). "[P]hysicians and
health care providers are immune from legal sanctions, or are given only mild sanctions,
for failing to abide by a patient's" refusal of medical treatment. Id. See M. Rose Gasner,
Financial Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 499 (1992). "[T]o date, there has been no significant, final monetary award
to a patient or an estate" for the infringement on the right to refuse treatment. Id. See
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("An-
derson I"), appeal after remand, 1995 WL 109128 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995) ("Ander-
son Ii'), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). The appellate court held that "life is not a
compensable harm." Id. See also Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) holding that "we are not prepared to say that life, even with severe disabilities, con-
stitutes an actionable injury." Id.
7. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The
Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L. J. 625 (1986); William C. Knapp & Fred
Hamilton, "Wrongful Living" : Resuscitation as a Tortious Interference with a Patient's
Right to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. Ky. L. REV. 253, 260-62 (1992); Hackelman, supra
note 6; Adam A. Milani, Better off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a
"Wrongful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patient's Advanced Direc-
tives, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149 (1997).
8. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996). The
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recognition of a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treat-
ment, a cause of action for violation of this right has received virtually no
support in the American legal system. 9 The problem appears to be that
courts are reluctant to recognize prolonging life as a cognizable injury
entitling the plaintiff to damages.1"
While courts have refused to recognize the relatively new wrongful liv-
ing cau;e of action, courts and legal theorists assert that patients receiving
unwanted medical care may still sue for damages in tort based primarily
in battery or negligence principles.'1 Under these tort actions, the inter-
Ohio Supreme Court explains the purpose of the wrongful living cause of action, stating
that "the event or loss for which the plaintiff seeks damages is neither death nor life, but
the prolongation of life." Id. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 258. "[T]he wrongful
living plaintiff asserts the highly personal right to decide what medical treatment he or she
will choose to accept, even if the choice to forego that treatment will almost certainly result
in the individuals own death." See Hackelman, supra note 6, at 1358. "[A] cause of action
is needed to maintain the meaning of the right to refuse treatment. The wrongful living
claim cart ensure that physicians and health care providers do not substitute their personal
values fcr those of their patients by awarding damages to the patients." Id. See Oddi,
supra no:e 7, at 665. The wrongful living cause of action "fully recognizes a person's right
to die and provides compensation for the loss suffered by that person for interference with
it, namely, the prolongation of life." Id.
9. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228. The Court concluded that "there is no cause of ac-
tion for 'wrongful living."' Id. See also Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) denying a cause of action for wrongful prolongation of life.
10. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at
*3(Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1995). "It is the law of the case that Winter cannot recover damages
for wrongful living. By that we mean that he cannot recover general damages just for
finding himself alive after unwanted resuscitative measures." Id. See also Greco v. United
States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995). Recognizing life as an injury would be adverse to the
"very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has placed on human life,
rather than its absence." Id. See also Flanagan v. Williams 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993). "We are not prepared to say that life.., constitutes an actionable injury." Id.
See also Milani, supra note 7, at 221. Arguing against a cause of action for wrongful living
Milani explains that such a suit requires the court to "decide if [life's] worth is so minimal
that the person would be better off dead and is entitled to compensation for living." Id.
Milani caims the judiciary is not equipped to make this decision and has "no business
declaring that among the living are people who are better off dead." Id.
11. See Willard H. Pedrick, Dignified Death and the Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 387, 396 (1991).
[W]iaen health care givers subject a competent patient to life sustaining proce-
dures against his or her will, the settled law of torts provides a remedy by way of
an action for battery, with resultant liability on the part of the health care givers
for substantial damages, both general and punitive.
Id. See Anderson II, No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *3 (Ohio App. 1 Dist 1995). "If...
the fact finders determine that negligence or battery occurred ... the estate may legally
recover damages caused by the unwanted resuscitative efforts and express violation of his
wishes." Id. See Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct.. App. 1984).
Holding that "a patient may recover for battery if his refusal [of medical treatment] is
1998]
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ference with the right to refuse medical treatment, whether it be per-
formed intentionally or negligently, theoretically gives rise to a claim for
damages that are proximately caused by the interference.' 2
Although the law entitles patients to bring tort claims for unwanted
lifesaving treatment, patients and estates bringing such suits have encoun-
tered significant difficulty in realizing damages for these claims. 3 In fact,
it was the extreme reluctance of our legal system to recognize damages
under traditional tort claims that prompted the development of the
wrongful living cause of action.'4 A significant factor influencing the re-
fusal to recognize damages in these tort suits has been the determination
that any injury associated with unwanted lifesaving medical treatment is
inextricably bound to the injury of prolonging life, and is thus not cogni-
zable.' 5 The universal refusal to recognize prolonged life as an injury
deserving damages' 6 and the difficulty of succeeding in traditional tort
suits have frustrated plaintiffs who seek to prove a legitimate causal con-
nection between the unwanted treatment in question and the damages
they seek. 17
This Comment explores why the judicial system in this country has cat-
egorically resisted allowing recovery for the violation of an individual's
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical
treatment. It examines the legal principles that shape the debate over
whether to permit recovery, as well as discusses some alternative solu-
tions, which may reduce the current inconsistency in recognizing a consti-
tutionally protected right without providing recovery for its infringement.
The Comment is divided into six sections. The first section explores
ignored." Id. See Steven I. Addelstone, Liability for Improper Maintenance of Life Sup-
port: Balancing Patient and Physician Autonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255, 1267-73 (1993).
A patient or his estate can seek recovery in suits based in battery, negligence, breach of
contract and constitutional actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
12. Anderson II, No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *3. The appellate court held that a
patient was entitled to all damages proximately caused by the administration of unwanted
lifesaving medical procedures. See discussion of causation in fact and proximate cause infra
notes 54-55.
13. See 2 MEISEL, THE RiGrr To DIE 401 (2d ed. 1995).
14. Id.
15. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228-29 discussed infra in text accompanying notes 66-
104.
16. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992). "Appellant's attempt to create a wrongful living cause of action fails because life is
not a compensable harm." Id. See also Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (Ohio 1996); Benoy v.
Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185,
191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
17. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). See also Gasner, supra note 6, at 499.
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the right to refuse medical treatment as it was confirmed in Cruzan, and
examines the legislation which has developed to enable patients to exer-
cise th:is right to die. The second section examines the elements, justifica-
tions for and criticisms of the wrongful living cause of action. It also
presents the tort claims that remain available to patients and their estates
for the infringement of one's right to die. The third section present's An-
derson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital,8 a recent case involving a claim
for infringement of the right to refuse treatment following an unwanted
resuscitation. A discussion of this case demonstrates the difficulties plain-
tiffs encounter in bringing claims for either wrongful living or more tradi-
tional tort causes of action. The fourth section analyzes the Anderson
case to highlight the roadblocks that have prevented individuals from re-
covering for an infringement of their right to die. The fifth section ex-
plores some solutions which address these traditional barriers. The final
section provides a commentary on the frustration that right to die plain-
tiffs have encountered and will continue to encounter under the current
state of the law.
II. THE RIGHT TO DIE AND LEGISLATION GIVING IT EFFECT
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The United States Supreme Court recognized that competent individu-
als possess a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment in
Cruzan.'9 At the foundation of the Court's recognition of this right are
the fundamental principles of bodily integrity and the common law legal
18. See Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d 841, appeal after remand, No. C-930819 1995 WL
109128 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225.
19. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). Competent individ-
uals have the right to refuse medical treatment pursuant to the 14th Amendment Due
Process Clause. "[W]e assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe-
tent peron a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."
Id. See also George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan
and Cru:,an to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 Duo. L. REV. 875, 876 (1996). "If you're competent
you have a right to refuse any treatment, for any reason." Id. See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
279-82. Where the competency of a decision to refuse treatment is called into question,
Cruzan requires that a patient's liberty interest be balanced against a state's interest in the
preservation of human life. Id. at 279. In achieving this balance, the Court supports a
state's right to require "clear and convincing" evidence to establish proof of a patient's
desire to refuse lifesaving treatment. Id. at 281-82. "The choice between life and death is a
deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition
of heighi:ened evidentiary requirements." Id. at 281.
1998]
396 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:391
doctrine of informed consent."z The doctrine of informed consent pro-
vides that "[a] physician who treats a patient without consent commits a
battery, even though the procedure is harmless or beneficial."'" The
Supreme Court determined that the logical corollary of the doctrine of
informed consent was that a patient generally possesses the right not to
consent.22 This right not to consent, in turn, was held to encompass the
right of competent individuals to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, or
in more colloquial language, "the right to die."2 3
B. Legislating the Right to Die
Following the Court's decision recognizing an individual's right to re-
fuse medical treatment, a concerted effort by both federal and state legis-
latures began to give it practical effect.24 Currently, on the federal level,
the Patient Self Determination Act 5 requires medical institutions to pro-
vide patients with information concerning their right to make decisions in
connection with medical care, including the right to accept or refuse med-
ical or surgical treatment, and the right to formulate advanced directives,
documents establishing what medical treatment an individual will or will
not undergo.26 On the state level, "natural death" or "living will" legisla-
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. "[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person .. " Id. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)). The principle of bodily integrity has led to the requirement that informed
consent be present before the administering of medical treatment. Id. "The informed con-
sent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law." Id. at 269. The court
also recognized that some courts have found a right to refuse lifesaving treatment based on
the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 270 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert
denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)). For other cases basing a right
to refuse treatment on the constitutional right to privacy see Rasmussen v. Flemming, 741
P.2d 674, 681-682 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301(Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
21. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
22. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. "The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed con-
sent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treat-
ment." Id.
23. Id. at 279.
24. See Milani, supra note 7, at 158-60. See also Jon L. Spargur, Jr., First Healthcare
Corp. v. Rettinger: Are Living Wills Dead in North Carolina?, 32 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
591, 592 (1997). "In the last two decades, numerous states have enacted legislation to
protect individuals' decisionmaking rights when the end of life draws near." Id.
25. Patient Self Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(f)(1993).
26. See Id. See also David B. Clarke, The Patient Self-Determination Act, in HEALTH
CARE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES at 93-94 (John F. Monagle & David C. Thomasma eds.
1994). "Advance directive is the general term for a variety of documents designed to en-
able competent adults to make health care decision-making plans in advance of future
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tion has been enacted by nearly all states enabling individuals to dictate
for themselves the withdrawal of medical assistance upon diagnosis of a
terminal condition.27
Both the Patient Self Determination Act and a majority of state stat-
utes give effect to advanced directives formulated by individual pa-
incapacity, including terminal illness." Id. The Patient Self Determination Act requires
Medicare and Medicaid institutional providers to: 1) provide written information to pa-
tients about the person's right to accept or refuse medical treatment and the right to com-
plete advanced directives; 2) indicate in the patient's records whether or not he or she has
establishe-d an advanced directive, 3) ensure compliance with state laws concerning ad-
vanced directives; and 4) provide education for the institutional staff on issues concerning
advanced directives. Id. at 93. Additionally, "each state ... must develop a written de-
scription of the law of the state ...concerning advanced directives and distribute the
document to local health care providers .. " Id. at 94.
27. Milani, supra note 7, at 159 (footnote ommitted). "Almost every state has now
adopted a living will statute that permits competent adults to execute advance directives
stating that they do not wish to be kept alive by medical treatment in the latter stages of
terminal illness or if they become permanently or irreversibly unconscious." Id. The state
statutes zurrently legislating the right to refuse medical treatment include the following:
ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100
(Michie 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1996); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-
101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (West Supp. 1996);
DEL. CODE ANN. TrI. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1995);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-.401 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12
(1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Michie Supp. 1992); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 35/1-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-4-1 to -21
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.621-
.643 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN.
HEALTH-GEN. I. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17
(West Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4141-101 to -121 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 459.01[0-.055 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-401 to -416 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535-.690 (1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to 16 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West
1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); N. D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15 (West
1994 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, §§ 3101.1-.16 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV.
STAT. §l' 127.505-.660 (1993); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (West Supp. 1996);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 234.11-1 to -14 (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law.
Co-op supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996);UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-
11-1 to -1119 (1993 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1994); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.920
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.0l-.15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-101 to -208 (Michie
1994).
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tients2 8 An advanced directive is the means by which competent adults
may plan for a medical decision at some time in the future when they
might no longer possess decision-making capacity. 9 Generally, there are
three types of advanced directives: living wills, proxy directives and com-
bination directives.3 0 A living will is a document which gives instructions
to health care providers about particular treatments that an individual
would or would not approve of in efforts to prolong his or her life.31
Proxy directives, also known as durable powers of attorney, permit an
individual to appoint someone to make medical decisions for them in the
event that he or she is incompetent to do so for themselves.3 2 A combi-
nation directive forges into a single instrument the ability to appoint an
individual to make treatment decisions with the proxy instructions con-
cerning the patient's wishes regarding refusal of certain treatments.33
Building on the United States Supreme Court's recognition of a consti-
tutional right to refuse lifesaving treatment, the United States Congress
and a majority of state legislatures have taken these proactive steps to
protect patients from the infringement of this right. But while this kind
of legislation has had a significant impact on the awareness as well as the
protection of this right, the right to die has not received judicial support.
III. THE WRONGFUL LIVING CAUSE OF ACTION & TORT AcTIONS
SEEKING RELIEF FOR THE INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO DIE
A. Wrongful Living
A claim for wrongful living exists where a patient or his estate is seek-
28. See supra notes 25-27.
29. 2 MEISEL, supra note 13, at 5-6. In addition to giving legislative effect to the right
to refuse medical treatment as established in Cruzan, advanced directives serve three pur-
poses. The first enables an individual to exercise some degree of control over refusing
medical care if he or she lacks the capacity to make decisions at the time they need to be
made. Second, advance directives eliminate the need to turn to the legal system to ascer-
tain whether to discontinue life-saving treatment. By establishing express wishes regarding
treatment in writing, court battles regarding an individual's "clear and convincing" desire
to refuse medical treatment become unnecessary. Finally, advance directives provide im-
munity from liability for the health care providers who respect the wishes of the patient in
the refusal of treatment.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. See also Clarke, supra note 26, at 94-95. Living wills are "written statements
... signed by a competent adult, witnessed and perhaps notarized, that affirm that, in the
event of terminal illness the person wishes to forgo treatment that would serve only to
prolong the dying process and would not effect a cure or recovery." Id.
32. 2 MEISEL, supra note 13, at 6.
33. Id.
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ing a remedy for the injury of continued living resulting from an un-
wanted. administration of lifesaving medical treatment in violation of that
individual's express wishes asserting the right to die.34 To understand
why courts have rejected wrongful living as a cause of action,35 it is help-
ful to examine all of its elements.
In actuality, wrongful living is a damages concept, and like a claim for
"wrongful whiplash" or a "wrongful broken arm," it is an action which
necessarily involves an underlying claim of negligence or battery.36
Where a wrongful living claim involves an underlying claim of battery,
the plaintiff must prove that there was an intentional, unconsented to
touching which caused injuries warranting damages.37 Where a wrongful
living suit is based on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that
there was a duty, that there was a breach of that duty, and that said
breach caused the plaintiff an injury deserving of damages.38
Given that Cruzan establishes a liberty interest in the right to refuse
medical treatment, proving the unconsented to touching required in an
underlying claim of battery is relatively easy so long as a medical profes-
sional, who is actually aware of the patient's refusal, proceeds to render
lifesaving treatment in spite of said refusal.39 Similarly, the duty and
breach requirements in a suit founded on negligence present few obsta-
cles.4° The plaintiff need simply "postulate a breach of duty owed by
medical providers to be aware of and honor the patient's previously ex-
pressed desire to forego potentially lifesaving treatment. ,41
When a plaintiff seeks damages for prolonging life, in theory, few ob-
stacles exist to establish the element of causation. "Once it is established
34. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. "The patient asserts a right to enforce an informed,
competent decision to reject life-saving treatment." Id. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 641. "If
the interfering treatment is made and the patient lives, then interference with the right to
die involves compensation for living .... [T]his is the 'wrongful living' cause of action." Id.
35. See Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 846. "Appellant's attempt to create a wrongful
living cause of action fails .... [O]ur role is not to create causes of action." Id. See also
Anderson II, No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.). "Ohio does not recog-
nize such an action." Id. See also Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (confirming that no claim
for wrongful living exists in Ohio); Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993) (rejecting a cause of action for wrongful prolongation of life).
36. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 261.
37. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER & KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 39-42 (5th ed. 1984)(for a discussion of battery generally).
38. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, supra note 37, at
164-68 (for a discussion of negligence generally).
39. Id.
40. Gasner, supra note 6, at 499.
41. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 261
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that but for the conduct of the medical professional, death would have
resulted, the causation element of a 'wrongful living' [claim] is satis-
fied.",42 So if a court were to accept prolongation of life as an injury, the
causation requirement would be satisfied so long as the patient exper-
ienced prolonged life.
The real difficulty plaintiffs encounter in wrongful living suits lies in
convincing courts that the prolonging of an individual's life is an injury
meriting damages.43 In attempting to quantify the damages that result
from prolonged life, courts have traditionally, and understandably, been
unwilling to measure the comparative value of being versus non-being. 44
Thus even though an unconsented to touching or breach of duty may
have been established, courts have refused to recognize the wrongful liv-
ing cause of action because of their extreme discomfort with visualizing
the injury being claimed, life, as an injury at all. 45
B. Traditional Tort Claims in Negligence and Battery
While courts have refused to accept claims for wrongful living because
they are ill at ease finding a cognizable injury in continued living, they do
not prohibit claims brought directly under battery and negligence. 46 The
42. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
43. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 266. "By far the most difficult element of
a 'wrongful living' claim is the concept of continued life as a compensable injury." Id.
44. Id. at 266. "[C]ourts have consistently held, either as a matter of policy or of
proof, that they are unable to calculate the value of life as contrasted to the value of 'non-
life."' Id. See also Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). "The crux of the problem is
that there is no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with
the pain and suffering of existence .... Although damages.., need not be calculated with
mathematical precision, they require at their base some modicum of rationality." Id. at
763.
45. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 248 (Nev. 1995)(quoting Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)). Recognizing life as an injury would be ad-
verse to the "very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has placed on
human life, rather than its absence." Id. See also Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512
N.E.2d 691, 697 (I11. 1987) (quoting Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812, stating that the comparison
of life versus non-life is a "comparison the law is not equipped to handle.").
46. Oddi, supra note 7, at 636.
If the treatment was intentional and with knowledge that the person asserting the
right to die had withheld consent, the tort of battery ... obviously lie[s]. Absent
an intent to override the patient's wishes, there is also the possibility that one
could negligently breach a duty not to treat where the party providing the treat-
ment should have known of the patient's refusal to be treated.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Willard H. Pedrick, Arizona Tort Law and Dignified Death,
22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 78 (1990). "The health-care giver who subjects the.patient to life-
sustaining procedures against contrary instructions ... is subject to liability for assault and
battery." Id. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)(explaining
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legal theory supporting these suits is identical to that described above
where battery or negligence serves as the underlying cause of action for a
suit in wrongful living. The plaintiff alleges that a medical professional
either intentionally47 or negligently4 8 administered lifesaving treatment
against his express wishes and without his consent. Unlike wrongful liv-
ing, the injuries claimed in battery or negligence tort actions are not fo-
cused directly on the prolonging of life, rather, the concern is on injury to
the person proximately caused by the administering of unwanted medical
treatment.49
Under traditional tort law, "one injured by the tort of another is enti-
tled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present, and
prospective, legally caused by the tort."5 In any tort action the primary
elements are injury, harm and damages.5 Traditionally, these elements
have been defined as follows: "injury refers to the invasion of a legally
protected interest; harm, to the loss or detriment suffered by the victim of
such an invasion; and damages, to the money that may be recovered by
the victim from the person legally responsible for the injury." 2 For
courts to award damages in a tort action a cognizable injury to the plain-
tiff must exist, which causes harm or detriment to him which the court
believes can be rectified in some way with financial compensation.
Whether a tort action is founded in battery or negligence, the ability to
recover damages requires a "causal connection" between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.53 To establish this causal
that the administration of treatment without consent and without legal justification is a
battery). See also Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George, No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
"If... the fact finders determine that negligence or battery occurred ... the estate may
legally recovery damages caused by the unwanted resuscitative efforts and the express vio-
lation [of the right to refuse treatment]." Id.
47. A suit in battery requires an intent to bring about a harmful or offensive contact.
When a patient or a surrogate has notified a physician that he does not want a particular
treatment, subsequent rendition of that treatment to that patient is offensive. 2 MEISEL,
supra note 13, at 354 (1995).
48. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841 (holding that damages
could be recovered if a hospital and its employees failed to use reasonable care in making
certain that written orders regarding a patient's treatment were followed).
49. Anderson II, 1995 WL 109128 at *5. "If the jury determines that adverse conse-
quences to [a patient] occurred in a natural and continuous sequence following the un-
wanted. resuscitative effort, then... [the] estate may recover all damages related thereto."
Id.
50. 2 MEISEL supra note 13, at 435 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910
(1979);1.
51. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 7(1), 7(2), 12(A)).
52. Id.
53. Oddi, supra note 7, at 637.
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connection, the tortfeasor's actions must be both the "causation in fact",54
and the "legal" or "proximate"55 cause of the patient's injury.
Applied to a claim for the infringement of the right to refuse medical
treatment, an award of damages requires that the medical professional's
conduct: 1) was at least a "substantial factor" in bringing about a patient's
injury, thereby satisfying the causation in fact, and 2) was the proximate
cause of that injury and subsequent harm.
A frequently cited case for the availability of traditional tort remedies
in right to die situations is Estate of Leach v. Shapiro.6 Decided in the
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Summit County, 7 Leach allowed recovery of
54. W. PAGE KEATON ET. AL., supra note 37, at 263. Causation in fact involves a "but
for" or "sine qua non" test which holds that "the defendant's conduct is a cause of the
event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely the defendant's
conduct is not a cause of the event if the event would have occurred without it." Id. at 266.
However, once events are set in motion by a defendant's conduct, there is virtually no limit
in terms of causation, as to what he can be held to have caused in fact. Id. Courts there-
fore, generally require that a defendant's misconduct must represent a "dominant cause"
or at least a "substantial factor" in the causation of the plaintiff's injury to be deemed
causation in fact. Id. "If a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plain-
tiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other
causes have contributed to the result." Id. at 268.
55. Id. at 272-73. A sufficient causal connection is not established with only a showing
of causation in fact. Id. An inquiry remains as to whether the defendant should be held
legally responsible for the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 273. That question is answered by deter-
mining whether the defendant's conduct was the "proximate" cause of the injury. Id. Prox-
imate cause is a legal creation formulated to limit the liability of a defendant even where
causation in fact is clearly established. Id. Instead of a factual inquiry, proximate cause
involves a determination of what consequences courts are, as a matter of policy, prepared
to attribute to the conduct of the defendant. Id.
As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which
are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is
justified in imposing liability. Some boundaries must be set to liability for the
consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.
Id. at 264. Courts have advanced several different theories to draw the boundaries sought
under proximate cause. Id. at 273. The proximate cause formulation that has been adopted
by at least one court ruling on a claim for damages resulting from unwanted medical treat-
ment includes at least three factors. See Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d 841, 845; Anderson H, No.
C-9308191995 WL 109128 at *5. In two separate decisions involving the same case, this
appellate court held that the factors used to determine whether an injury was proximately
caused included whether the injury 1) was reasonably foreseeable, 2) occured in a natural
and unbroken sequence, and 3) was not superseded by any intervening cause. Anderson I,
614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, 1995 WL 109128 at *5; see also KEATON ET. AL., supra note
37, at 272-321 (discussing the numerous factors and interpretations that have influenced
the common law understanding of proximate cause).
56. Leach, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
57. The Ohio appellate court deciding Leach was not the same court that decided the
Anderson case discussed below.
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damages in a case brought by the family of a woman who claimed she had
been maintained on life support systems against her express wishes.58
In its decision, the court stated that "[a] physician who treats a patient
without consent commits a battery, even though the procedure is harm-
less or beneficial,"59 and that a cause of action exists for wrongfully plac-
ing and maintaining a patient on life-support systems contrary to the
express wishes of the patient and her family.6" Further, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs might be justified in recovering all extraordinary
and unnecessary medical expenses resulting from the non-consensual
treatment, as well as for the pain and suffering of the patient.
61
Unfortunately for patients seeking recovery for the wrongful adminis-
tration of lifesaving medical treatment, Leach is one of the only cases that
has recognized damages in tort for infringement on the right to die. 62
Apparently courts are wary of recognizing any damages which they view
as inextricably linked with the injury of prolonged life.63 Guided by this
hesitance, courts presented with right to die suits have refused to draw a
line of causation between infringement on the right to die and damages
resulting from undesired treatment.64 Furthermore, the courts' reluc-
tance also is based upon the theory that, because patients are generally so
vulnerable and close to death at that point, it is difficult to say that the
injury complained of would not have occurred without the unwanted
medical treatment.65 In other words, that the unwanted medical treat-
ment was a causation in fact of the plaintiff's injuries.
Consequently, though the traditional suits of battery and negligence
remain available to right to die plaintiffs in theory, the limited case law on
this issue suggests that the reality is quite different. The Anderson case
demonstrates the tremendous difficulty plaintiffs face in recovering dam-
58. M.
59. Id. at 1051.
60. d. at 1052. The court held that a patient or his estate may recover damages which
foreseeably flow from the institution of life support treatment against the patient's wishes.
61. Id. at 1055.
62. Other cases include: Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 1995 WL 109128
(Ohio Ct. App 1995); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992); Bartling v. Gendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)(affirming the potential cause of action in battery for improper maintenance of life
support).
63. See discussion of Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio
1996) inFra notes 66-71.
64. Id.
65. .Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228-29. See also 2 MEIsEL supra note 13, at 436-37 (dis-
cussing the difficulties with recognizing pain and suffering damages for right to die cases).
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ages for infringement on their right to refuse lifesaving medical treat-
ment, regardless of whether they bring suit based upon wrongful living or
traditional battery and negligence tort claims.
IV. A NDERSON v. Sr. FRANcIS-ST GEORGE HOSPITAL
On October 10, 1996, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided a suit initi-
ated by Edward H. Winter for the infringement of his right to refuse life-
saving medical treatment.66 He sought damages for a paralyzing stroke he
suffered shortly after receiving unwanted lifesaving resuscitation.67 Mr.
Winter argued that he had been wrongfully resuscitated by hospital per-
sonnel in violation of his express wishes to refuse any lifesaving
treatment.68
In its decision, the court denied Mr. Winter's estate 69 any recovery
stemming from the damages he incurred from the hospital's infringement
on his constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.70 This
holding reversed two prior appellate court decisions, that held it possible
for Mr. Winter's estate to recover all damages proximately caused by the
unwanted resuscitation. 7' As the most recent state court decision to con-
template recovery in a suit claiming a violation of the right to refuse med-
ical treatment, Anderson presents the current state of this issue and the
legal rationale both for and against the award of damages resulting from
infringement of a right expressly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court.72
A. Facts and Procedural History
On May 25, 1988, having already suffered two heart attacks and diag-
nosed with chronic heart disease, eighty-two-year-old Edward H. Winter
was admitted into St. Francis-St. George Hospital suffering from cardiac
insufficiency. 73 In a conversation with his doctor, Mr. Winter' indicated
that he wanted no extraordinary lifesaving measures taken in the event of
66. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
67. Id. Mr. Winter died in 1990 and Keith W. Anderson, the Administrator of his
estate, amended the complaint to substitute himself as plaintiff. Id. at 226.
68. Id.
69. Mr. Winter died soon after bringing this suit.
70. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
71. Id.
72. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
73. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George, No. C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995).
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further illness.74 The doctor entered a "no code blue" order on Mr. Win-
ter's nedical chart, indicating that Mr. Winter had exercised his right to
refuse emergency medical treatment.7 1 Three days later, when Mr. Win-
ter experienced an episode of an irregular heart rhythm, a condition that
can be quickly fatal, a nurse apparently unaware of the "no code blue
order," resuscitated him by means of defibrillation.76 Two days later, Mr.
Winter suffered a stroke which left him partially paralyzed on his right
side for the remaining two years of his life.77 He died in 1990, following
nearly two years of extensive pain, suffering and medical expenses.78
Mr. Winter's estate brought suit against the hospital for the pain, suf-
fering, and medical expenses he incurred as a result of the violation of his
express right to refuse lifesaving treatment. 79 Winter's estate based its
claim upon two alternate theories of liability resulting from the hospital's
administration of lifesaving medical treatment despite Mr. Winter's ex-
press wishes to the contrary.80 One claim advanced the theory that Mr.
Winter had suffered a wrongful living, claiming prolonged life as an injury
deserving damages, as a result of the unwanted treatment.81 The alterna-
tive claim sought damages under the traditional tort claims of battery and
negligence arising out of medical treatment to which Mr. Winter did not
consent.82
The trial court held that Winter's wrongful living claim was not cogni-
zable under Ohio law, but did not rule on the estate's other claims based
on traditional tort principles of battery or negligence.83 On the case's
first appeal (Anderson I), a state court of appeals84 upheld the dismissal
of the wrongful living claim, but remanded the case for an examination of
the claims based in battery and negligence. The reason for the remand
was for a determination as to whether defibrillation was included within
the scope of the "no code blue" order, and if it was, to determine what
damages, separate from those claimed for wrongful living, were proxi-
mately caused by the defibrillation.85 Upon remand, however, the trial
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
76. Id. Defibrillation involves an electronic shocking of the heart.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id.
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court again granted summary judgment to the hospital on all damage
claims.86
A second appeal (Anderson II) followed and the same court of appeals
reversed, stating that the estate could recover all damages found to be
proximately caused under either battery or negligence. When the case
reached the Ohio Supreme Court by means of a discretionary appeal, the
court reversed both appellate decisions holding that no damages were
available for the hospital's infringement on Mr. Winter's right to die.8"
B. Appellate Court Conclusions Regarding Recovery for
Unwanted Resuscitation
In both appellate decisions, the court confirmed that no cause of action
existed in Ohio for wrongful living resulting from unwanted medical
treatment.88 That is, one cannot recover general damages "just for find-
ing himself still alive after unwanted resuscitative measures." 89 Both de-
cisions, however, did recognize the plaintiff's right to bring an action in
battery or negligence for the infringement on his right to refuse medical
treatment. 90
The court framed the issue in terms of "what compensable damages
arise from the violation of a competent adult patient's right to refuse
treatment."'" Resting its decisions on the fundamental tort principles of
causation and damages, the court held in both decisions that, if on re-
mand the finders of fact determined that negligence or battery had oc-
curred, the estate could legally recover all damages proximately caused
by Mr. Winter's unwanted resuscitation.92 Since Mr. Winter's estate was
prepared to offer testimony that it was medically foreseeable for Mr.
Winter to suffer a stroke in the days following resuscitation, the Court of
Appeals remanded the issue for a jury to decide.93 The court's remand
on the second appeal carried instructions that if the jury determined that
Mr. Winter's adverse health consequences occurred in a natural, continu-
ous and unbroken sequence following defibrillation, then the estate could
recover all related damages. Related damages included: all medical ex-
86. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *1.
87. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996)
88. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *3.
89. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *3.
90. Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d at 844-45; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
91. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *3.
92. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
93. Anderson, 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
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penses after resuscitation; the costs of living in a nursing home; any ex-
traordinary costs related to care; as well as for pain, suffering and
emotional distress related to the stroke.94
C. Supreme Court Conclusions Regarding Recovery for
Unwanted Resuscitation
Like the appellate court, the Ohio Supreme court confirmed the non-
existerce, in Ohio, of a wrongful living cause of action. 95 Unlike the ap-
pellate court however, the supreme court refused to allow recovery for
the reasonably foreseeable damages resulting from Mr. Winter's un-
wanted resuscitation.96 The court stated that, in reality, the court of ap-
peals had recognized a cause of action fundamentally identical to an
action for wrongful living.97 To support this conclusion, the court pointed
to the lack of any evidence that the defibrillation by itself caused or con-
tribute d to Mr. Winter's stroke and subsequent suffering in any way other
than simply prolonging his ailing life.98
The court refused to draw the line of causation between the defibrilla-
tion and Mr. Winter's subsequent stroke, concluding that "an act is not
regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have oc-
curred without the doing of the act . . ." and that there was no evidence
that the stroke would not have occurred without defibrillation.99 The
court believed that when an ailing, eighty-two-year-old man's life is pro-
longed., numerous injuries and ailments could forseeably follow resuscita-
tion without having been caused by the defibrillation." ° Rather, the only
injury caused by the defibrillation was the prolonging of Mr. Winter's
life. " ' To grant recovery for life, that is, the injury of continued living,
simply was unacceptable to the court.
10 2
In refusing to recognize that the stroke and subsequent damages were
caused by the unwanted defibrillation, the court held that the only dam-
ages available to the estate were those suffered directly from the un-
94. Id.
95. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
96. Id. at 228-29.
97. Id. at 228. "The court of appeals' theory of recovery seems to be identical to the
theory of recovery underlying a claim of 'wrongful living."' Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 228.
100. Id. at 228-29
101. Id.
102. Id.
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wanted touching.'1 3 Since the actual touch was in itself physically
harmless, (outside of its life saving correction of Mr. Winter's heart's
rhythm) no damages were granted Mr. Winter's estate.' 4 The court ob-
served, however, that "unwanted life-saving treatment does not go un-
deterred," and that appropriate licensing sanctions against the medical
professionals responsible were appropriate. 105
The legal conclusions reached by the Ohio Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Ohio clearly negate the existence, in Ohio, of a wrong-
ful living cause of action. The two courts differ significantly, however,
regarding the damages recoverable in tort for the infringement on the
right to refuse medical treatment.
V. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS IN ANDERSON
The Anderson case provides an excellent example of how the ability to
recover damages for the infringement on the right to die has been se-
verely limited by the legal dilemma inherent in recognizing life as a com-
pensable harm. An evaluation of Anderson is particularly helpful in
understanding the current state of the law for right to die plaintiffs for a
couple of reasons. First, it is the most recent case to contemplate poten-
tial recovery for an infringement on the right to die. Second, it is the only
state supreme court decision to rule directly on the availability of dam-
ages for unwanted lifesaving treatment since Cruzan. An analysis of the
divergent decisions authored by the appellate and supreme courts in this
Ohio case not only demonstrates the prevailing judicial approach to re-
covery for unwanted medical treatment, but also provides a greater un-
derstanding of the legal impediments affecting right to die litigation.
Importantly, the decision clearly exemplifies the contradiction between
the existence of a constitutionally protected right and no significant legal
redress for a violation of that right.
1. Wrongful Living
While the court of appeals and the supreme court accept in Anderson
that a patient has a right to refuse medical treatment as established in
Cruzan, °6 both expressly enunciate that no cause of action exists for
103. Id. at 229.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. "Because a person has a right to die, a medical
professional who has been trained to preserve life.., is required by a legal duty to accede
to a patient's express refusal of medical treatment." Id.
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wrongfil living in the state of Ohio.10 7 Consistent with all jurisdictions
that have ruled on this matter, both courts refused to recognize life as a
cognizable injury.10 8 Both the appellate and supreme court concurred in
the principle that an individual cannot recover general damages just for
finding himself alive after unwanted resuscitative measures. 10 9
2. Battery or Negligence
The appellate and supreme court differred significantly as to what dam-
ages may theoretically be recovered in a tort action based in negligence
or battery for the infringement on the right to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment. The court of appeals supports the potential award of damages
by holding that a plaintiff may recover "all damages related thereto,""'
including medical expenses, extraordinary expenses related to care, pain,
suffering and emotional distress,"' provided a sufficient causal connec-
tion exists between an unwanted resuscitation and the adverse conse-
quence:s which follow. Reversing this interpretation, the Ohio Supreme
Court denied potential damages, holding that where the record clearly
indicated that Mr. Winter would have died without the lifesaving defibril-
lation, damages claimed in connection with a subsequent stroke were in-
extricably linked to a cause of action for prolonging life, and therefore
not recoverable. 1
2
Central to these inapposite findings regarding the damages available to
a right to die plaintiff is the respective willingness of each court to find
that an, damages other than a prolonged life resulted from the unwanted
resuscitation. Specifically, the focus with respect to the question of dam-
ages was what injury, if any, could have been proximately caused by the
unwanted defibrillation separate and distinct from the injury of pro-
longed life. The answer to this question is dependent upon the manner in
which each court approaches the causal connection between the un-
107. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *2;
Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 846.
108. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 846. "Damages ... are not those things that add to life,
but those: that subtract from it." Id. For a discussion of cases refusing to recognize life as a
cognizable injury see supra note 10.
109. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *2;
Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 846.
110. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
111. Id.
112. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (holding that the only reason Winter was able to
suffer the stroke was because his life was prolonged by defibrillation).
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wanted resuscitation and Mr. Winter's stroke and subsequent suffering
and/or expenses.
The court of appeals held, in both decisions, that the plaintiff can re-
cover all damages proximately caused by the unwanted defibrillation.113
In Anderson H, the court stated that "[i]f an injury occurs in a natural,
continuous and unbroken sequence, it is reasonably foreseeable, and the
tortfeasor is responsible for it." '114 While still requiring a finding of causa-
tion between the intentionally or negligently administered treatment and
the patient's damages, this holding offers a more expansive interpretation
of what damages may be attributable to a breach of the right to refuse
medical treatment. It does not limit the reasonably foreseeable result of
the defibrillation to the prolonging of Mr. Winter's life.115
Unfortunately for right to die plaintiffs, this expansive approach was
rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court. Its restrictive interpretation of
those damages caused by the adminstration of lifesaving medical treat-
ment provides the ultimate legal standard in Ohio. It found the court of
appeals' recognition of potential damages "to be identical to the theory of
recovery underlying a claim of 'wrongful living.""' 6 That is, because the
court finds the only injury possibly "caused" by the defibrillation to be
the continuation of Mr. Winter's life, any suit brought to recover for the
unwanted lifesaving treatment necessarily implicates a finding of life to
be a cognizable injury." 7 Therefore, like a wrongful living suit, the plain-
tiff's battery and negligence claims necessarily implicate the impossible
valuation of being versus non-being. 1 8
By equating a cause of action seeking the foreseeable damages proxi-
mately caused by unwanted medical treatment with a cause of action for
wrongful living, the court effectively eliminates recovery for the right to
refuse medical treatment in Ohio. Its limited line of causation prevents
Mr. Winter from recovering general damages for pain and suffering asso-
ciated with his stroke and restricts his potential damages to those suffered
directly from the battery or negligent conduct resulting from unwanted
medical treatment.'19 Given this strict construction, these damages
would be limited to nominal damages because the defibrillation in itself
113. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
114. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
115. Id.
116. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 229. "The only damages ... [plaintiff] may recover are those damages suf-
fered ... due directly to the battery." Id.
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was physically harmless.12°
An examination of the Anderson decisions in light of the traditional
tort principles of causation reinforces the idea that divergent approaches
to the causation issue played a significant role in each court's position on
the damages recoverable from an unwanted lifesaving resuscitation. The
Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of the potential causal connection be-
tween the defibrillation, Mr. Winter's stroke and his subsequent damages
is based entirely on an examination of "causation in fact." Reciting the
"but for" or "sine qua non" test for causation, the court finds that an act
is "not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have
occurred without the doing of the act."'' Following this fundamental
principle, the court concludes that the unwanted resuscitation did not
even amount to a "substantial factor" in the damages suffered by Mr.
Winter:;. The court holds that "Winter suffered the stroke because the
nurse enabled him to survive" '122 and "[b]ecause the nurse prolonged
Winter's life, numerous injuries occurring after resuscitation might be
foreseeable, but would not be caused by the defibrillation.'
'1 23
The court of appeals, on the other hand, approached the causation di-
lemma by focusing on the "proximate" or "legal cause" of Mr. Winter's
damages. 124 Although the court rejected wrongful living as a compensa-
ble harm, the fact that it remanded the case for a determination of proxi-
mately caused harms resulting from the defibrillation indicates that from
its persepective, the unwanted resuscitation was at least a cause in fact of
Mr. Winter's injuries.' 25 Conceding that the defibrillation might have
been a cause in fact, it left for a jury to determine the extent to which the
defibrillation proximately caused Mr. Winter's subsequent damages.' 26
Consequently, the hospital could be responsible for Mr. Winter's stroke
and related damages if a jury determined that subsequent injury: 1) was a
120. Id. at 229. "Where the battery was physically harmless, however, the plaintiff is
entitled 1.o nominal damages only." Id. But see Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d at 847. Nominal
damages are not available for a negligent touching.
121. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
122. Id.
123. id. (emphasis added)
124. Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5.
125. Id. The court appears to acknowledge that the defibrillation was a substantial fac-
tor in bringing about Mr. Winter's injuries. See supra note 54 discussing causation in fact.
126. Anderson H, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5. "If the jury determines that the
adverse ionsequences to Winter's health occurred in a natural and continuous sequence
following the unwanted resucitative effort, then Winter's estate may recover all damages
related thereto. " Id.
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reasonably foreseeable result of the defibrillation;127 2) occurred in a nat-
ural and continuous sequence following; 128 and, 3) no superseding cause
existed.
129
The fact that each court focused on a different aspect of the causation
element is not surprising considering how differently each approached the
issue. The supreme court applied a very strict interpretation of causation,
limiting the result of defibrillation to the immediate prolonging of life.'
31
It refused to recognize the existence of causation in fact; therefore, a dis-
cussion of "proximate cause" was unnecessary.1 31 The court of appeals,
in comparison, assumed in both decisions, the presence of "causation in
fact" without comment. Instead, it focused exclusively on proximate
cause, namely, whether it was fair to hold a tortfeasor accountable under
these circumstances, and provided the standards necessary for a jury to
make such a determination. 132
Through its restrictive holding, the Ohio Supreme Court creates a very
difficult, if not impossible, barrier to recovery in tort for the infringement
on an individual's right to refuse lifesaving treatment. The court of ap-
peals decisions may have offered a glimmer of hope for plaintiffs looking
to recover for the infringement on this right, but the supreme court effec-
tively shut the door by refusing to extend liability to those damages it
views as inextricably linked to the injury of prolonged life.' 33 Anderson
clearly demonstrates how the courts' general refusal to view life as a com-
pensable harm prohibits recovery not only for suits in wrongful living, but
also for right to die suits raised under tort actions of battery and
negligence.
127. Anderson II, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 at *5 (framing the issue as "was it reason-
ably foreseeable that unwanted resuscitative measures would cause adverse health conse-
quences to [Mr. Winter]?").
128. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 845. In Anderson I, the Court explained that "later
harms are proximately caused by the wrongful act if ... they are part of a natural and
unbroken sequence resulting from the act." Id. (citation ommitted). Likewise, in Anderson
II, the court held that the later injury was proximately caused if the resulting stroke was
reasonably foreseeable, defining reasonably foreseeable to mean the injury occurred in a
natural, continuous and unbroken sequence. Anderson II, No C-930819 1995 WL 109128,
at *5.
129. Anderson I, 614 N.E.2d at 845.
130. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229. Holding that the defibrillation itself did not contrib-
ute to the stroke in any other way than "simply prolonging his life." Id.
131. See supra notes 54-55 (discussing the two elements of proximate cause).
132. Anderson 1, 614 N.E.2d at 845; Anderson II, No. C-930189 1995 WL 109128 at*5.
133. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229. The court's holding that the conceivable results of
the resuscitation were limited to the prolonging of Mr. Winter's life it links any injuries
which follow to the injury of life itself.
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VI. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF RELIEF FOR RIGHT TO DIE PLAINTIFFS
A. Special Damages As An Alternative to General Damages: The
Wrongful Life Approach to Damages
A possible solution to mitigate the courts' reluctance or inability to
award general damages' 34 for the violation of the right to refuse medical
treatme~nt would be to allow only special damages135 for the medical ex-
penses and extraordinary costs incident to the plaintiff's continued liv-
ing. 13 6 The maintenance of an individual's life through life supports can
be extremely expensive.137 Likewise, the medical expenses and ex-
traordinary care (nursing home, special care etc.) required by an individ-
ual following an unwanted resuscitation, can be staggering. 138 Granting
relief for infringing on one's right to die by awarding special damages
would lend some practical significance to the right to refuse medical
treatment by allowing the patient or his estate to recover those costs
which would not have been incurred but for the violation. At the same
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (6th ed. 1990). Defining general damages:
such as the law itself implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong com-
plained of, for the reason that they are its immediate, direct, and proximate re-
sult, or such as necessarily result from the injury, or such as did in fact result from
the wrong, directly and proximately, and without reference to the special charac-
ter, condition, or circumstances of the plaintiff.
Id. (citaions ommitted)
135. [d. at 392. Defining special damages:
Those which are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury complained
of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the
par:icular case, that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions. Such are
damages which do not arise from the wrongful act itself, but depend on circum-
stances peculiar to the infliction of each respective injury.
Id.
136. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 269.
137. Robert Dzielak, Physicians Lose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug: The Debate
About Continued Futile Medical Care, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 733, 767 n.214 (1995). Life
support equipment for a single patient may easily amount to $2000 per day. See also David
Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38
B.C. L. REV. 443, 460 (1997). When the Supreme Court was deciding whether to permit
the withdrawal of Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube, the costs of her care were reported to be
more than $130,000 per year.
138. Harris Meyer, Egging People On, HoSPITALS 1996, October 20, 1996, at 36. Nurs-
ing home care costs for an individual are $40,000 a year on average, and can rapidly wipe
out most people's life savings. Almost seventy percent of all nursing home residents end
up having their care at least partially funded by Medicaid, many after exhausting their own
funds. :See also Paul J. Zwier, Looking for a Non-legal Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide
and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 199, 202 n.22 (1996). Some estimates of long
term nursing care run as high as $100,000 for the average person. The average stay of
nineteen months runs from $30,000 to $60,000 annually.
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time, granting special damages would not require courts to recognize the
prolongation of life as a cognizable injury deserving of general dam-
ages.139 That is, by utilizing this approach, courts could side step the in-
tractable dilemma of measuring the value of life versus the value of non-
life.
Like wrongful living, wrongful life is a tort claim which forces courts to
consider life as a compensable harm. A wrongful life claim is a suit
brought against a doctor by or on behalf of a child who has been born
with a disease or other disorder and alleges that he or she would not have
been born had the physician not negligently failed to inform his or her
parents that the particular defect might occur.1 4° While some of the sub-
stantive elements of wrongful life suits differ from those in a claim for
unwanted resuscitation or administration of life-supports, both claims in-
volve theories of recovery deeply rooted in the concept of "life" as a cog-
nizable injury."'
While only three states currently recognize the right of a child to bring
a wrongful life claim,14 the manner in which courts in these jurisdictions
have approached the issue of damages for such claims could prove very
helpful in formulating and awarding damages for the infringement on the
right to die. As a means of granting some relief to plaintiffs in wrongful
life actions without expressly acknowledging the child's life as an injury,
these courts have turned to awarding special damages for the extraordi-
nary medical care and related expenses suffered by the child and his or
her family.143 An excellent example of this special damages approach is
found in Procanik v. Cillo,'44 a New Jersey Supreme Court case uphold-
ing a child's claim for wrongful life stemming from a physician's negligent
failure to diagnose measles during the first trimester of pregnancy. 145
While the Procanik court refused to recognize general damages, declaring
that "there is no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare
non-existence with the pain and suffering of ... impaired existence. . .
139. Procanik v. CiUo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J 1984).
140. Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful
Birth in the United States and England, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 535, 536 (1995).
141. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 258. "Valuation of life exists as legal problem
in ... [both] situations."
142. Jackson, supra note 140, at 540. (footnote omitted) New Jersey, California and
Washington have recognized wrongful life. See e.g. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483
(Wash. 1983); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J 1984); Tirpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954
(Cal. 1982).
143. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762; Turpin, 643 P.2d 954 at 965.
144. Procanik, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
145. Id.
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it did grant special damages for the medical expenses and extraordinary
costs associated with the child's impairment.146 In doing so, the court
found that "the interests of fairness and justice are better served through
more predictably measured damages - the costs of the extraordinary
medical expenses necessitated by the infant plaintiff's handicaps., 147
Limitinig recovery to special damages, the Procanik court was able to
award monetary damages for costs incurred by the child and his family
without having to undertake the implicit recognition of life as a compen-
sable 'injury otherwise required in a finding for general damages for a
child's pain and suffering.
The special damages approach presents a means to effectuate the right
to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. Damages awarded for medical ex-
penses and extraordinary costs associated with an unwanted resuscitation
or unwanted administration of life support would provide important re-
lief for patients and families forced to incur the thousands of dollars nec-
essary to cover medical bills, nursing homes, and special care
requirements. 148 Given that such extraordinary costs would not have oc-
curred, but for the failure to honor a patient's wishes to exercise his or
her constitutional right to refuse treatment, it only seems fair that the
patient or his family be compensated for these expenses. Importantly,
special damages would not mandate a factfinder to evaluate "being v.
non-being." '49 Instead, all that need be calculated is the cost of medical
expenses or extraordinary care commencing at the time of the wrongful
resuscitation or administration of life support systems and ending at the
time of the patient's death.' 5°
A closer look reveals that special damages are well suited in a claim for
the infringement of the right to refuse medical treatment.' 5 The calcula-
tions For the medical and extraordinary expenses associated with a pro-
longed life can be made with even more precision than those involved in
a claim for a wrongful life.' 52 Assessing special damages in a wrongful
life claim involves a highly speculative assessment of the expenses to be
146. Id. at 762-63.
147. Id. at 763.
148. See supra notes 137-38.
149. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 269. Asserting that the award of special dam-
ages for medical expenses in wrongful life cases "should be extended to wrongful living
cases, ,ince such damages do not require an assessment by the fact finder of the relative
value of 'being versus non-being."' Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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incurred over the lifetime of a child.' 53 In comparison, in a claim for an
unwanted resuscitation or administration of life support, special damages
can be calculated within a very precise time frame beginning with the
commencement of undesired treatment and ending with the patient's
death.1
54
B. Non-Payment For Unwanted Medical Treatment
Given the immense difficulties plaintiffs face in recovering for the tor-
tious infringement on a patient's right to refuse lifesaving treatment, an-
other alternative for right to die plaintiffs may be refusing to pay health
care providers for unwanted medical treatments. Utilizing fundamental
contract principles, some commentators have argued that patients or
their families should not be forced to pay for unwanted or unconsented to
treatments.
155
Following basic contract and consumer law principles, this non-pay-
ment argument provides that "medical services should be considered as
would any other economic commodity - to be paid for only when volun-
tarily, knowingly, and competently purchased.' '156 Any health care pro-
vider/patient relationship is in reality a bilateral contract to perform
services in which mutual promises are exchanged between the parties.
This relationship is supported by consideration; provider promises to give
medical care and patient promises to pay.' 57 However, where the patient
or his or her proxy does not consent to a particular medical intervention,
no contract exists for that treatment. Neither they, nor a third party payer
who is obligated to act for the patient's benefit, should have any duty to
render payment for those services.'5 8
In addition to alleviating the burden of paying for unwanted medical
services, non-payment could promote greater respect among health care
providers for a patient's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. The
financial loss incident to non-payment for lifesaving treatment would
force physicians and health care facility administrators to follow more
conscientiously the treatment preferences and values expressed by or on
153. Id.
154. Id. "Wrongful living suits necessarily involve assessment of damages for a period
commencing at the time of the wrongful resuscitation or institution of life-sustaining ther-
apy and ending at the time of the patient's death." Id.
155. Marshall B. Kapp, Enforcing Patient Preferences: Linking Payment for Medial Care
to Informed Consent, 261 JAMA 1935, 1936 (1989).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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behalf of patients.15 9 Under such a system, health care providers would
either respect the patient's wishes or provide treatment that will never be
compensated.1 60
Utilizing the law of contracts to require health care institutions to meet
the significant costs associated with administering life saving treatments
against a patient's express wishes would not replace the general damages
a plaintiff seeks in a tort suit for an infringement on the right to die. It
would,, however, require health care institutions heed the wishes of an
individual regarding the right to refuse treatment. As added support,
non-payment also can provide substantial relief to those plaintiffs who
suffer financial detriment when third party providers no longer cover the
costs of an artificially prolonged life.
VII. PLAINTIFFS' INABILITY TO RECOVER FOR THE INFRINGEMENT ON
THE RIGHT TO DIE
The right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment as recognized in
Cruzan may prove to be a right in name only. While the Supreme Court
and federal and state legislatures have taken steps to recognize and effec-
tuate 1the right to die, the courts of this country have generally refused to
hold that an infringement upon this right precipitates a compensable
harm. 161 The reluctance to recognize damages in actions asserting a vio-
lation of the right to die has been guided by a categorical refusal to recog-
nize life as a cognizable injury deserving monetary damages.162 As stated
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson, assessing damages for life
"demonstrates the outer bounds of liability in the American civil justice
system. "163
To date, no court in any American jurisdiciton has recognized a claim
for wrongful living: a suit that asserts a patient's life was wrongfully pro-
longed as a result of unwanted medical treatment.164 The problem with
this novel cause of action is that the alleged harm is life itself. Given the
general aversion to valuing being versus non-being, it is unlikely that
159. See Gasner, supra note 6, at 513-20.
160. Id. "Withholding reimbursement means that the provider must either honor the
patient's wishes or render treatment that ultimately may not be compensated." Id.
161. See id. at 499.
162. See supra text accompanying note 10.
163. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
164. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996); Benoy
v. Simon, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)(denying a cause of action for wrongful
prolongation of life).
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right to die plaintiffs will ever succeed under the wrongful living cause of
action.
It has been argued, however, that plaintiffs are not prohibited from
recovering for an infringement on the right to die under traditional tort
principles.165 Indeed, two Ohio state appellate courts have held that
plaintiffs may recover general damages caused by an unlawful infringe-
ment on their right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. 166 Unfortu-
nately for plaintiffs who look to these decisions for support in seeking
relief for the harm suffered incident to an infringement on a their right to
die, the Supreme Court of Ohio significantly limited the potential relief
advocated by these courts. 67
The final decision in Anderson effectively prohibits the recovery of
general damages in tort for the infringement on the right to refuse lifesav-
ing medical treatment.1 68 In its decision, the court refuses to recognize
that any damages can be proximately caused by an unwanted resuscita-
tion other than the injury of prolonged life.16 9 If the court's conclusions
are followed, any suit brought to rectify an infringement on the right to
refuse treatment, whether it be a resuscitation or the administration of
life supports, would be analogous to the forbidden suit of wrongful living
because the only "harm" caused would be life.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The principle that life, in itself, cannot be a compensable harm is con-
sistent with our society's general respect for and protection of individual
life. However, unless courts are willing to broaden the limited approach
to causation advocated by the Ohio Supreme Court and find that com-
pensable damages can exist seperate and distinct from a prolonged life,
no recovery in tort will exist for violation of the right to refuse lifesaving
treatment.
To mitigate the potentially devastating precedent Anderson sets for the
ability of a plaintiff to recovery under traditional tort principles, this
Comment suggests two alternatives that can provide financial relief for
patients and their families and simultaneously foster greater respect for
165. See supra note 11.
166. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George, 614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992),
appeal after remand, C-930819 1995 WL 109128 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995); Estate of
Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
167. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 225.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 228-29.
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an individual's right to refuse lifesaving treatment. First, awarding special
damages for the medical expenses and extraordinary costs associated with
a prolonged life appears to represent an appropriate means of compensa-
tion which can rectify the financial loss plaintiffs would not have suffered
but for the unwanted treatment. 170 Second, non-payment for uncon-
sented to treatment would not only relieve plaintiffs of the financial bur-
den of paying for unwanted treatment, but also force healthcare
providers to be more cognizant of an individual's right to refuse treat-
ment.17 These approaches are particularly attractive to right to die plain-
tiffs because they do not require courts to conduct an analysis of whether
life is a compensable harm. Unfortunately, these two approaches, which
present plaintiffs with viable relief alternatives for an infringement on the
right lo refuse treatment, have not gained recognition by American
courts.
As . result, right to die plaintiffs continue to face significant challenges
in convincing the American legal community to allow recovery for the
damages suffered by a patient following the unwanted administration of
lifesaving treatment. The widely shared belief that the prolongation of life
is not a compensable harm will continue to constrain courts in recogniz-
ing any significant remedy for the infringment on the right to die. Bar-
ring a dramatic shift in judicial sentiment, the right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment, as established in Cruzan, will remain a right in name
only without any significant remedy at law.
John Donohue
170. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 7, at 269.
171. See Kapp, supra note 155, at 1936.
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